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Self-reflexivity, description, and the boundaries of narrative cinema 
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This article proposes a bridge between an early and a late work of Gérard Genette, 
namely his article Frontières du récit (1966) and his collection of essays Fiction et 
Diction (1991). In Frontières du récit, Genette pointed at two instances of “anti-
narrative” intrusion into narrative. The one is what Emile Benveniste called “discourse”, 
meaning the self-reflexive comments of the narrator, and the other is description, a mode 
of utterance that, when found in a narrative, temporarily withholds the flow of the story. 
In the context of the proliferation of these instances in current narrative films, and in the 
light of Genette’s observations in Fiction et Diction, I will suggest that these anti-
narrative elements provide us with a chance to fundamentally reconsider the notion of 
narrative and to configure a paradigm shift in narratology, which Genette had already 
foreseen in his early work.   
 
The border of self-referential discourse  
 The self-reference or “self-reflexivity” of a text has been associated with a (more 
or less explicit) self-conscious/self-expository move on behalf of the maker, that has a 
distancing effect upon the reader/recipient. In the case of storytelling, self-reflexivity 
suspends the reader’s or viewer’s immersion into the story, and ads multiple layers of 
signification.1 In general, self-referential methods in art, literature and film have been 
considered tools that trigger critical reflection on behalf of the recipient.2  
 There is a certain tension between self-reflexivity and narrative, related to self-
reflexivity’s association with discourse. Highlighting this tension in his article 
“Frontières du récit” (1966, English translation by Ann Levonas 1976), Genette refers to 
discourse (discours), meaning the voice of the author and his or her self-referential 
accounts, which “intrudes” the text and suggests a threat to the “purity” of narrative. In 
the complex model of narrative that Genette later developed, self-reflexivity would 
correspond to the analytical category of “narrating instance”, the manifestation of which, 
in the form of discourse, disrupts the récit (narrative).3 The distinction between narrative 
and discourse was initiated by Aristotle, who considered separately certain types of 
poetry, the “lyric, satiric and didactic poetry”,4 that were not representational, that is, they 
did not reflect external actions (real or fictional), but rather expressed the poet’s own 
thoughts. In the 1960s the French linguist and semiotician Emile Benveniste reintroduced 
the distinction between narrative as story (what he called histoire) and discourse. 
Benveniste defined the pure form of narrative as one that remains uncontaminated by the 
subjectivity of discourse; in pure narrative, the narrator’s presence goes unnoticeable, and 
nothing distracts the recipient from the immersive experience of reading.  
[…] the objectivity of narrative is defined by the absence of all reference to the narrator. 
“Truly there is no longer a ‘narrator.’ The events are chronologically recorded as they 
appear on the horizon of the story. Here no one speaks. The events seem to tell 
themselves.5  
Chronological sequentiality or “linearity” here also appears as a feature of “pure 
narrative.” Genette stresses that instances of pure narrative, 6  such as the ones that 
 2 
Benveniste finds in some passages of Balzac, are isolated, and that almost every text 
comprises of both narrative and discursive passages.7 This hybridization notwithstanding, 
a tension is still introduced by the discursive, and in this sense, self-referential passages 
of stories: “any intrusion of discursive elements into the interior of a narrative is 
perceived as a disruption of the discipline of the narrative portion”.8 This is not the case 
when narrative is embedded in discursive modes of expression. “Narrative inserted into 
discourse transforms itself into an element of discourse, but discourse inserted into 
narrative remains discourse and forms a sort of cyst, easily recognized and localized. One 
might say that the purity of narrative is more obvious than that of discourse”.9 Continues 
Genette:  
[…] discourse has no purity to preserve since it is the natural mode of language, the 
broadest and most universal mode, by definition open to all forms. On the contrary, 
narrative is a particular mode, marked and defined by a certain number of exclusions and 
restrictive conditions (no present tense, no first person, etc.) Discourse can “narrate” 
without ceasing to be discourse. Narrative can’t “discourse” without betraying itself. 10  
       According to Genette, the anti-narrative function of discourse lies in the insertion of 
subjectivity to the otherwise seemingly “objective” sequence of events (récit). Self-
reflexive discourse has an anti-mimetic and, in this sense, “anti-narrative” character, as 
long as it intervenes through everything that undermines objectivity. The self-reflexive 
attributes of discourse are closely related to the function of cinematic enunciation, also 
studied by Benveniste. Discourse always reminds to the viewers the discrepancy between 
them being, on the one hand, enunciators of the filmic text (and “makers” of the story) 
and, on the other hand, enunciated, subjects situated by the filmic discourse.11 It thus 
rejects the objectivity and naturalness of histoire, close to which Genette places “pure 
narrative”. 
       When it comes to film, direct instances of self-referential discourse are not common. 
However, self-reflexivity makes its presence noticeable through various metanarrational 
or metafictional techniques and stylistic devices that break with narrative’s “purity”.12 
Literary and semiotic models of self-reference became particularly influential in the 
decades of 1960s and 1970s, and determined the conceptualization of self-reflexivity in 
film theory.13 The (post-)Marxist and structuralist tradition of film theory stepped on self-
reflexivity’s anti-mimetic character, to associate the term with an ideologically loaded, 
Brechtian “break with the illusionism of the spectacle”. Especially apparatus theory, 
drawing on Barthes and also on Althusser and Lacan, considered cinema a medium 
intrinsically ideological, and pointed at the necessity to find ways to resist the imposition 
of the apparatus over the spectator’s consciousness; one of these ways was found in self-
reflexivity. This theoretical background of self-reflexivity determined the way it is until 
today conceived in film theory, and also in the cognitive strands of film narratology. As 
representative of the latter, Edward Branigan places (self-)reflexivity among other “anti-
narrative devices”, as he calls them, such as “irony, paradox, contradiction, novelty, or 
alienation”. 14  The reflexive device is for him “prescribed to provide a critical and 
intellectual distance (‘opacity’) that frees the viewer from delusion.” 
 Thus, even when detached from the actual narrating “voice” and Genette’s literary 
discourse, self-reflexivity in film is also found in tension with the supposed objectivity of 
pure narrative, as well as with that of the filmic mode of representation, which, for certain 
critical stands of film theory, is inherently mimetic.15  
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The border of description  
       Another, albeit “ill-defined” border of narrative is, according to Genette’s 1966 
article, description. His discussion of description reflects a tension drawn in the literary 
and also the film theoretical tradition between narrative and description. The traditional 
view of narrative considers it to be distinct from description, because description does not 
conform to the overall causal and temporal succession of the story; it rather suspends 
time and action. This tension between description and narrative comes from the period of 
Enlightenment and its system of ideas and was systematically treated by Lessing in his 
distinction between temporal and spatial arts, and particularly poetry and painting. As 
Joseph Frank notes, Lessing used to advise poets to give emphasis on action and not on 
description, because action fits the linear temporality of language.16 In the same vein, 
descriptive passages in narratives have been considered extra-narrative prostheses rather 
than organic parts of narrative. They are, in a way, “cysts” as well.  
       As Genette recognizes, description per se has different attributes from narrative. It 
lingers on objects, turning actions into “scenes”. The word scene is relevant to the 
juxtaposition of objects in space.17 There have been periods in literary and art history 
where the descriptive and spatial aspects of texts came to the fore. For instance, 
description has been a central characteristic of baroque art and poetry, as Genette notes.18 
The development of the novel, however, gave prevalence to another, “explicative and 
symbolic” function of description, 19  one that serves the fundamental processes of 
narrative, that is, the logical order (causality) and temporal order (succession), as Tzvetan 
Todorov would have it,20 or, in other words, its dramatic and temporal aspects.21 For 
example, in the novels of Balzac the description of things is expressive of the inner life of 
the characters, serving in a way the development of the narrative. In general, for Genette, 
description comes to serve the needs of the dramatic unfolding of the diegesis, and thus it 
is, in a sense, subordinate to narrative.22  
 As with self-referential discourse, in the case of cinema description becomes a 
problematic category. Based on the work of Genette but also on that of the French 
theorist Philippe Hamon, Seymour Chatman attempted, from the aspect of film 
narratology, to clarify the instances of description in cinema. Following Genette’s 
contrast between narrative and description, Chatman problematized the role of 
description in narrative films. In his book Story and Discourse (1978) he declares his 
conviction that “description per se is generally impossible in narrative films”. Description 
in literature is associated with pause and lingering; in film, however, “the story-time 
keeps going as long as images are projected on the screen, as long as we feel that the 
camera continues to run”.23 Thus, for Chatman “pure” description is impossible in the 
medium of cinema. Films do not permit the “lingering” found in literary texts. In film, 
even when no action takes place, “the focus remains on the event”. Descriptive details, 
Chatman repeats in Coming to Terms (1990), “can only occur as a byproduct of plot 
action; they do not have a separate existence”.24 The effect of description can be however 
created by cinematic means, as it happens in the case of freeze frame.25 A freeze frame, 
instead of serving plot needs, would allow more time to be given to objects or persons in 
the frame “to reveal their own properties”;26 it would thus cinematically produce the 
pause and the lingering so characteristic of literary description. 
       These “boundaries of narrative”, self-reflexivity and description, are all the more 
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challenged in the post-1990s film tendency of complex narratives. Certainly such 
challenging has been the case in many avant-garde and art films of the past, but it still 
formed part of an alternative and rather marginal way of storytelling, in relation to the 
dominant Hollywood practices. What is stressed here is that now it seems that new forces 
tend to turn complex modes of narration into a new norm, as film narratives in which 
discourse and description proliferate are massively being promoted. 
 
Self-reflexivity and description in contemporary complex films  
       The way that Genette problematized the boundaries of narrative may provide insight 
into a recent tendency in narrative cinema, where, since the mid-1990s, films that have 
generally been characterized as “complex narratives” proliferate. Titles include films that 
belong to various genres and traditions and that have also been called by critics “puzzle 
films” or “network narratives”; from Pulp Fiction (1994), Fight Club (1991) and 
Requiem for a Dream (2000), to Babel (2006), Inception (2010) and Source Code (2011). 
In these contemporary “complex” films, self-reflexive discourse and description—in their 
particular cinematic modes—gain ground, to the point that they tend to become their 
defining characteristics.  
       Self-reflexivity, also found in postclassical modes of Hollywood narration after the 
1970s, 27  has a very intense presence in complex films. Referring to films such as 
Chunking Express (Chung Hing sam lam, 1994), Run Lola Run (Lola Rennt, 1998), Fight 
Club (1999) and Magnolia (1999), Eleftheria Thanouli finds that in them self-reflexivity 
disrupts the continuous and linear style of classical narration, through a proliferation and 
intensification of avant-garde techniques and “disruptive visual effects”. Thus, the 
neglected in the past as “too artificial or self-reflexive” techniques of “back projections, 
collages and optical tricks” make an impressive comeback in contemporary cinema.28 
These are particular modes of cinematic self-reflexive discourse, but also indicators of 
the knowingness or self-consciousness of the narration. The self-reflexivity at the level of 
cinematography and montage is accompanied by self-reflexivity at the level of narration: 
thus, as Thanouli maintains, in films such as the ones mentioned above, “the narrating act 
comes forward”, acknowledging the audience, providing them with clues to comprehend 
the story and showing its knowledgeability and spatiotemporal omnipresence.29  
       David Bordwell has also pointed out the high degree of self-consciousness in the 
complex films that he calls “network narratives” because they create networks of 
different characters and their stories, as it happens in Pulp Fiction, Chunking Express, 
Magnolia and Babel. Bordwell considers marks of the self-conscious stance of these 
films devices such as crosscutting, intertitles, montage according to a motif, time-
juggling, and openly suppressive narration.30 Especially the non-sequential ordering of 
events in a film is a form of overt, self-conscious—and self-referential—narration; a 
narration that also makes the viewer conscious of the presence of a narrative principle 
that manipulates the telling.  
       Genette was perhaps the first who indicated the self-reflexive function of time-
juggling (cases of “anachrony”) in (literary) texts. Referring specifically to “prolepses”—
the premature reference to future events, the equivalent of which in cinema is for 
Chatman the device of “flashforwards”31—Genette states that the latter are “not only data 
of narrative temporality but also data of voice”, which “bring the narrating instance itself 
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directly into play”. 32  This type of self-reflexivity is strongly communicated by 
contemporary complex films that play with temporal linearity. 
       Through their constant self-reflexivity and unwillingness to “suspend disbelief”—
considered to be a precondition for narrative immersion—contemporary complex films 
orientate the viewers’ attention towards mediation (as opposed to transparency), which 
characterizes not only the film’s world but also the “factual” world where the viewers 
live in, permeated by informational networks. 33  In this context of “hypermediated 
realism”,34 filmic self-reflexivity not only points at how reality is being transformed and 
“augmented” through various media, but also, and especially, at how only through these 
we can access reality (just like the protagonists often attempt). The same holds for our 
enjoyment of the films as viewers. Pleasure and connection to the story world comes 
through an awareness of the medium and its manipulation.  
       While the discursive cyst seems to be threatening the purity of narrative with its 
overwhelming presence in complex films, the other traditionally subordinate to narrative 
cyst, description, also seems to be growing, decisively shifting its hierarchical position in 
relation to narrative. All the more, as it becomes clear in contemporary complex films, 
narrative gets to serve description, instead of the other way around.  
       Chatman foresaw the possibility of such shift of hierarchy like the one that can be 
observed in complex films, and especially those that have an episodic or “thread” 
structure.35 As he pointed out in Coming to Terms, apart from the particular case of freeze 
frame, in cinema it is by means of contiguity and parallelism that description might be at 
work, evoking spatial patterns that connect disparate images, objects or even narrative 
episodes. Drawing on Christian Metz and his account of description as a mode of editing, 
Chatman argued that even action, one of the main foundations of narrative, is possible to 
be described instead of narrated in cinema, provided that this action is composed by 
elements, the relation between which is one of “spatial parallelism at any given moment 
in time”. 36  Description renders contiguity (spatial proximity) more important than 
causality. As Chatman stresses, “description has a logic of its own, and it is unreasonable 
to belittle it because it does not resemble the chrono-logic of Narration”.37  
       The aspect of description is highlighted through the iterative editing rhythm of films 
such as Night on Earth, Run Lola Run, and Gomorrah, a rhythm that often suspends the 
narrative causal-logical connections between the film’s separate elements. The order in 
which the elements appear can thus be conceived as contingent, and the relation between 
them as paradigmatic rather than syntagmatic. The narrative elements, i.e. characters, 
events and story-threads, become objects that the viewers traverse through, as the film 
lingers on them, in its “parcours” from one to the other, a parcours less and less 
motivated by narrative action and causality. The excerpts from the stories of different 
characters become pieces that are juxtaposed in the space of the film, often considered to 
be contemporaneous and with no temporal successiveness among them. On the one hand, 
in films composed by multiple stories, the latter become “mini-narratives” that do not 
serve the composition of an overarching narrative, since there is not a beginning, middle 
and end in which we can place these autonomous stories, as it is the case in Gomorrah. 
On the other hand, in films where a certain chronological sequence between the multiple 
stories is ultimately suggested, and something reminiscent of a narrative whole may be 
created—as it happens for instance in Donnie Darko or Babel—this whole is yet 
explicitly given as tentative, and open to multiple possibilities and new contingent 
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connections, latent not only inside the diegesis but also between the diegetic universe and 
the “real” world of the viewers. Hence, the multiple mini-narratives or threads of the 
films may be themselves seen as objects of description, opening out to a larger but 
equally contingent and poorly ordered in a causal-logical way real world.  
 
Complex reality and complex diction 
Taking into consideration the proliferation of self-reflexivity and description in 
recent complex films, it seems that in them it is the narrative, as defined by its temporal 
and dramatic attributes, that tends to become the cyst, and a micro-element of a larger 
composition. However, can we dismiss the word narrative altogether when talking about 
films that ultimately still create story worlds? The problem seems to lie in the definition 
of the word narrative itself, and its connotations of a certain objective and verisimilar 
representation, which would imitate the causal-logical and spatio-temporal sequence of 
events in an idealized version of the real world. By adding many layers and dimensions 
of analysis, Genette and other prominent narratologists demonstrated that the study of 
narrative needs to take into account a complex textual and cognitive weaving, a mixture 
of discours and recit that spreads across multiple narrational levels. However, it is the 
laws of causality and spatiotemporal sequentiality, presupposed or expected in narrative, 
that introduce an internal tension with all the “anti-narrative” characteristics of texts, such 
as those of self-reflexivity and description. The recent proliferation of these 
characteristics in complex films points at the transcendence of narrative in the strict, 
“pure” definition of the term, against which narratology has always been struggling, 
however still without having achieved a radical emancipation from it. Self-reflexivity and 
description are anti-narrative according to the old norms of a certain verisimilitude of the 
histoire, against the backdrop of which the récit and the narration were always 
conceived. Narrative (the récit) can no longer be conceived to stand closer to the histoire 
(as it does in Frontières du récit), as contemporary mainstream narratives become more 
and more complex. On the other hand, the histoire, mimicking the order of an idealized 
representation of facts, cannot anymore be conceived as such, because, as I will argue, 
our own conception of what reality is has significantly changed—to the point that 
verisimilar representations do not appear convincing anymore. 
       A solution to the inner contradiction created between self-reflexive discourse and 
description on the one hand, and narrative on the other, is suggested by Genette through 
his own self-referential reflections at a later phase of his work. Specifically in Fiction et 
Diction (1991, English translation 1993), Genette looks back at his earlier work including 
Narrative Discourse (1980, based on Figures III, 1972) and Nouveau Discours du Récit 
(1983), and points at the problem of verisimilitude (or representational realism) and its 
association with narrative, which is, as I believe, also key for the understanding of 
contemporary complex films.   
 Fiction and Diction is a collection of essays dealing with special narratological 
problems such as how do we define literariness, for instance whether we do so according 
to the theme and intention of a work (fiction) or according to aesthetic criteria (diction). 
In the essay “Fictional Narrative, Factual Narrative” Genette observes that in a large part 
of his earlier work he tended to associate narrative with fiction, and to neglect factual 
narrative. Thus, he attempts to test whether his analytical categories of order, pace, 
frequency, mode, and voice, which he developed based on fictional narrative, can also be 
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applied to cases of factual narrative, such as historical narratives and autobiographies. 
The conclusion that he draws is that the differences between the two types of narrative, 
albeit existent, are not as rigid as one would imagine, as both fictional and factual 
narratives make use of the same stylistic elements. Fiction imitates, as Searle would have 
it, “nonfictional assertions”, but also factual narratives borrow fictional modes, and 
narratology should trespass the border between fictional and factual genres. As for 
contemporary complex fiction films, they heavily rely on factual diction with the 
proliferation of self-reflexive and descriptive modes. At the same time, however, this 
does not make them appear more factual. On the contrary, by using these modes they 
seem to become even more “fictional”, creating an unreal effect (e.g. The Jacket, Source 
Code, Take Shelter), which is perhaps because of the fact that our perception of reality 
feels more unreal than ever.38 In Source Code (Duncan Jones 2011), the protagonist is 
called to make mnemonic patterns out of objects described to him, and to self-reflexively 
evaluate the borders of his own reality in relation to the one presented to him. The viewer 
of this and other complex films is required to do exactly the same. In our hypermediated 
environment, the ways we use to connect to the real are through reflexivity, and openness 
to contingent connectivity among seemingly unconnected objects (what description 
effectuates as a mode of textual diction). This results into fiction being less verisimilar to 
its own norms as a genre (a tendency Genette observes in Fiction and Diction), 39 but 
closer to our conception of a hypermediated real. Thus, in the same way that Genette 
calls narratology to cross the borders between fiction and non-fiction, as literature itself 
does, we could nowadays suggest a similar move on behalf of contemporary (film) 
narratology, to reconsider these borders once again, the way that contemporary cinema 
does.  
 Narrative norms can well prevail for a long period, but as Genette notes, they can 
be subject to transformation. Such transformation is I think taking place with the 
contemporary wave of complex narratives, a shift in the prevailing norms, which perhaps 
also suggests a—long awaited—paradigm shift for narratology. At first, the two elements 
that Genette indicated as boundaries of narrative in 1966, namely discourse and 
description, seem to be pointing beyond the borders of the fictional world of narrative, 
and thus to be introducing an internal tension with it. On the one hand, self-reflexivity 
inserts the “reality” of the narrating instance, and of the medium itself. On the other hand, 
description inserts a “factual” and contingent way of engaging with the elements of the 
diegetic world but also with what remains out of it. However, taking into account 
Genette’s subsequent reconsideration—and integration—of factual narrative into his 
general narrative model, the tension that these two elements, self-reflexivity and 
description, introduce is now more clearly drawn not with one specific instance of 
narrative, namely the fictional one, but with narrative altogether, and more precisely, with 
certain verisimilar presumptions “built” in the conception and definition of narrative, 
which tie it to representation. These are issues coming to the fore by the current wave of 
research on ‘unnatural narratology’.40 The emancipation of narrative as a notion from the 
dominant norms of verisimilitude and “legitimacy”, 41  and from representational 
schemata, would verify a prediction Genette had made already in Frontières du récit, 
commenting on the way the literary “experiments” of the 20th century, from Hemingway 
to Robbe-Grillet, tested narrative against other incompatible to it modes of utterance, 
such as discourse:  
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Perhaps the novel, after poetry, will definitively leave the age of representation. Perhaps 
narrative, in the negative singularity that we have attributed to it, is, like art for Hegel, 
already for us a thing of the past which we must hasten to consider as it passes away, 
before it has completely deserted our horizon.42  
       My “circular” reading of early and late Genette suggests that both self-reflexivity and 
description blur the borders between the fictional and the factual, and create modes of 
diction that, on the one hand do not contradict storytelling, and on the other hand, may 
organize story worlds in different and more complex ways from the ones that have 
classically been associated with “narrative”, in literary but also in cinema theory. 
       Genette’s own self-reflexive discourse about his theory of narrative gives us the 
chance to rethink current film narratives from this perspective. The “anti-narrative” 
characteristics of self-reflexivity and description point at the merging of the factual with 
the fictional: on the one hand, in the case of the self-reflexive complex films, at a reality 
that is so much mediated that it is difficult to pose the borders between it and fiction; on 
the other hand, in the case of network-like complex films, at increasingly contingent and 
life-like narrative forms, to the extent that life is more and more recognized as coupling 
with randomness and uncertainty, rather than following idealized cause and effect 
sequences and the spatiotemporal continuity that has been linked with narrative. A two-
way merger of fiction and reality expressed by contemporary films makes Genette’s 
insights into the nature of narrative pertinent. As they constantly challenge the boundaries 
between fiction and reality, contemporary complex narratives in cinema seem to make a 
significant case for a long-awaited emancipation of narrative from representation.
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